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ANNUAL REPORT OF THE RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD FISCAL YEAR 1984



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

6 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 1984

This forwards the Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 133(c)(3).

The Board by statute provides me policy advice on matters relating to the Reserve Components. This report reflects those issues addressed by the Board, and presents a balanced view by recognizing both the problems that must still be overcome and the progress that has been made.

I am confident the Board will actively continue to assist our efforts to make further progress in the readiness of the Reserve Components.

Attachment

READEX FICHE best copy available

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

6 NOV 1985

Honorable George Bush
President of the U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

This forwards the Fiscal Year 1984 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 133(c)(3).

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I am confident the Board will actively continue to assist our efforts to make further progress in the readiness of the Reserve Components.

Sincerely,

Attachment

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

6 NOV 1985

Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

This forwards the Fiscal Year 1984 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 133(c)(3).

The Board by statute provides me policy advice on matters relating to the Reserve Components. This report reflects those issues addressed by the Board, and presents a balanced view by recognizing both the problems that must still be overcome and the progress that has been made.

I am confident the Board will actively continue to assist our efforts to make further progress in the readiness of the Reserve Components.

Sincerely,

Caspar Weinberger

Attachment

RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD

FISCAL YEAR 1984
ANNUAL REPORT

This report represents the views of the members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D.C. 20301

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INTRODUCTION

The Reserve Forces Policy Board is the statutory "principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" (10 USC 175). The Board meets quarterly both as a whole and in specific working committees. This report discusses the issues and recommendations derived from meetings, committee sessions, field trip observations, and reports. The Annual Report, as required by law (10 USC 133(c)(3)), presents the Board's independent evaluation, review and comment on the Department of Defense policies and programs as they relate to the Reserve Components.

The Annual Report not only comments on the FY 1984 activities of the Board in its independent role of reviewing and assessing the readiness of our Reserve Components, but also discusses suggested changes to policy or law which impact on the mission and affect the ability of the Guard and Reserve to fulfill peacetime tasking and wartime requirements. The Board's recommendations are at the end of chapters 2 through 6.

Major issues addressed by the Board this year include Manpower, Equipment, Training and Medical Readiness. Readiness and sustainability continue to be prime issues of interest within the DoD and Congress. The Board is pleased to note that while much remains to be done, progress is being made in correcting omissions of the past.

Readers are encouraged to comment on the Annual Report, and the Board's *Fiscal Year 1984 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components*, which is available upon request from OSD (RFPB).

The *Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1984* is divided into seven major sections:

- Importance of the Reserve Components to the Total Force
- Readiness of the Reserve Components
- Manpower
- Equipment
- Training
- Medical
- Board Activities for Fiscal Year 1984

CHAPTER 1

IMPORTANCE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS TO THE TOTAL FORCE

Composition of the Total Force

Reserve Components (referring collectively to the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve) continue to represent a significant portion of the total military strength of the United States. For example, on September 30, 1984, the Selected Reserve accounted for 1,058,185 individuals versus 2,175,943 serving in the Active Components; thus, 33% of the immediately available Armed Forces of the United States are composed of members of the Reserve Components. Additionally, another 450,208 individuals are members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING), and 44,422 are members of the Total Standby Reserve not immediately available for mobilization, constituting total Reserve Component strength of 1,552,815 or 42% of the total active and reserve military strength of this nation.

The Total Force is defined as:

> "The totality of organizations, units, and personnel (military and civilian) in both Active and Reserve Components of the Department of Defense."

Civilian personnel strength figures are not addressed in this report.

Table 1 illustrates the composition of the Total Force at the end of the Fiscal Year 1984.

TABLE 1
Partners in the Total Force

Selected Reserve
FY 1984 (Actual)



[1]Includes US Coast Guard.

Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Data as of 30 September 1984.

Tables 2 through 6 provide examples of each Reserve Component's contribution to the Total Force by Service and selected categories. Representative categories were chosen because of the multiplicity and variety of unit types within each Reserve Component.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve

Together, the Selected Reserve of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve constitute 48% (a 1% increase from FY 1983) of the total Army's strength. In general, the Army National Guard provides the Army with Combat units and the Army Reserve contains Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. Examples of the contribution of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are illustrated in Table 2.

TABLE 2
Comparison of Army National Guard and Army Reserve to Total Army Forces Selected Reserve



[1]Percentages are determined by counting like-type units.
[2]Does not include the 6th CBAC.

Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Data as of 30 September 1984.

Naval Reserve

The Selected Naval Reserve contains 18% (a 2% increase from FY 1983) of the strength of the total Navy. Organizationally, the Naval Reserve augments Active Naval Forces with similar type units and special mission units unique to the Naval Reserve. Examples of the contributions of the Selected Naval Reserve are highlighted in Table 3.

TABLE 3
Comparison of Naval Reserve to Total Naval Forces Selected Reserve


[1] 0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Tactical Carrier Air Wings (CVW)
Intelligence Personnel
Mobile Construction Battalions
Ocean Minesweepers
CONUS Based Logistical Airlift Squadrons (VR)/ Composite (Service) Squadrons (VC)
Cargo Handling Battalions
Special Boat Forces
0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Naval Reserve
Active Navy

[1]Percentages are determined by counting like-type units.

Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Data as of 30 September 1984.

Marine Corps Reserve

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve contains 17% (a 1% decline from FY 1983) of the manpower of the total Marine Corps. Table 4 illustrates selected contributions from the Marine Corps Selected Reserve.

TABLE 4
Comparison of Marine Corps Reserve to Total Marine Corps Forces Selected Reserve


[1] 0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Marine Light Attack Aircraft Missile Battalions
Marine Divisions/Air Wings
Force Reconnaissance Units
Self Propelled 8 Inch & 155mm Artillery Batteries
Tank Battalions
Bulk Fuel Units
Force Service Military Police
0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Marine Corps Reserves
Active Marine Corps

[1]Percentages are determined by counting like-type units.

Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Data as of 30 September 1984.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve

The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve together provide 23% (a 1% increase from FY 1983) of the total Air Force strength. The relative importance of the Selected Reserve of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, by major mission area is depicted in Table 5.

TABLE 5
Comparison of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to Total Air Force Selected Reserve



[1]Percentages are determined by counting primary assigned aircraft.
[2]Percentages are determined by counting like-type units.

Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Data as of 30 September 1984.

Coast Guard Reserve

The Coast Guard Selected Reserve contributes 25% (the same as FY 1983) of the total Coast Guard personnel strength. Examples of the Coast Guard contributions are shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6
Comparison of Coast Guard Reserve to Total Coast Guard Selected Reserve


0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Port & Merchant Marine Safety (10,000 personnel)
Vessels (835 personnel)
Air Stations (175 personnel)
Other Operational Shore Facilities (375 personnel)
Repair/Supply/Research (175 personnel)
Training Commands (375 personnel)
Command and Control (565 personnel)
0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Coast Guard Reserve
Active Coast Guard

NOTE: The percentages above are determined by counting individuals. The size of the exact peacetime base is difficult to determine because of the multi-mission nature of most of the operating units Reservists will be joining upon mobilization.

Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Data as of 30 September 1984.

Force Mix Study

In response to the request of the Senate Appropriations Committee (March 1983) to provide an independent assessment of the Department of Defense report, *The Guard, Reserve, and Active Components of the Total Force*, a Force Mix Committee was established by the Reserve Forces Policy Board (June 1983) to study the issues and evaluate the methodology employed by the Services in determining the personnel balance between the Active and Reserve Components and the rationale of mission assignments for each Component. This Committee, in conferring with the Services, developed a set of milestones to provide a rapid response to the Senate Appropriations Committee's request.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board generally applauded the Department of Defense reports to the Senate Appropriations Committee, agreeing with the majority of the views in reports of the Logistics Management Institute, but, where opposed, offered alternative recommendations. Briefly, the Force Mix observations of the Board were as follows (not prioritized):

- No guidance or documentation existed to provide for a rational Force Mix decision.
- Different criteria are applied by each Service to each Force Mix decision, apparently on an *ad hoc* basis, without documentation.
- Rarely is any costing data utilized. If used, it is not uniform.
- Alternative mixes have rarely been considered, and even when considered, not from the perspective of cost effectiveness.
- Once a mission area is established, varying criteria are utilized to determine resource allocations between the Active and Reserve Components.
- Each Service should be responsible for determining its own Active/Reserve Mix.
- The Department of Defense should provide definitive Force Mix issue leadership; specifically providing:

  a. Policy guidance.
  b. Cost comparison standardization, yet recognizing Service uniqueness.
  c. Insurance that OSD policy is implemented, including a periodic review by a balanced Civilian/Military Body.

To carry out the mandate of Congress, further investigation into the Force Mix issue is required. A uniformly structured and documented decision-making process is recommended, along with standardization of the costing methodology, in order that credibility can be achieved while the Services retain responsibility for Force Mix decisions.

Summary

Reserve Components are an indispensable and integral part of the Total Force defending this nation. The "ideal" Total Force is one which is balanced to a degree that the forces of all components blend together to form a synergistic, efficient and integrated team. Today's Total Force policy dictates that the Active components include the Reserve Components in virtually all contingency planning.

The goal of the leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services must be to demand and achieve equal professional competence and

performance in the Active and Reserve Components. However, the Reserve Components must have available the personnel, equipment, materiel, resources, and full time support to achieve the highest level of readiness possible.

Table 7 reflects the actual strength levels from FY 1975–FY 1984 and programmed levels for FY 1985–FY 1990. The programmed rate of growth in the Active Components is projected to reflect a slight increase during the FY 1985 through FY 1990 period. Concurrently, Selected Reserve strength and the strengths of the IRR/ING are projected to show substantial increases while the strength of the Standby Reserve is projected to decrease. The programmed growth for the Total Ready Reserve from FY 1984 to FY 1990 is five times greater than for the total Active Component. It is apparent that current manpower projections depict an ever increasing reliance on the Reserve Components in the Total Force mix.

TABLE 7
Composition of the Total Force, 1975-1990



Does Not Include US Coast Guard

SOURCE: Actual: Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations and Logistics). Programmed: Program Objective Memorandum (FY 1986-FY 1990) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Data as of 30 September 1984.

CHAPTER 2

READINESS OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

Each year the Board completes a comprehensive analysis of the readiness of the Reserve Components. The Board's *Fiscal Year 1984 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* continues to emphasize equipping our Reserve Component Forces and stresses the need for dynamic, challenging, mission-oriented training for all Reserve Component units.

Readiness Assessment

In contrast to declining readiness levels reported in 1983, nearly all the Reserve Components reported an increase in the percentage of units "marginally ready" or better. The Board believes that the ratings are a continued indication of the real increases in capabilities which have occurred over the past four years. Of those Reserve Components reporting a decline in readiness, the data suggests it is a temporary result of the conversion to more modern weapon systems and equipment. These new materiel authorizations and deliveries create a temporary situation of "unreadiness" because unit personnel are not fully trained on the new equipment, spare parts often arrive later than the major equipment item, and in some instances units with diffferent missions are being formed. During periods of transition, readiness will be "reduced" until individuals in the units become proficient and logistics challenges are resolved.

The two major limitations to Reserve Component readiness are generally unchanged since FY 1981. These two limiting factors in order of importance are Equipment On-Hand and the lack of Individual Skill Qualification (e.g. Military Occupational Specialty—MOS Qualification). Table 8 presents the major factors limiting readiness among the Reserve Components.

TABLE 8
Major Factors Limiting Overall Readiness in the Reserve Components, FY 1983 and FY 1984

Component (Type of Unit)	Most Critical FY 83	Most Critical FY 84	Second Most Critical FY 83	Second Most Critical FY 84
Army National Guard				
Overall	EOH	EOH	MOS Qual	MOS Qual
Combat	EOH	EOH	MOS Qual	MOS Qual
Combat Support	EOH	EOH	MOS Qual	MOS Qual
Combat Service Support	EOH	EOH	MOS Qual	MOS Qual
Army Reserve				
Overall	EOH	EOH	Personnel	MOS Qual
Combat	EOH	EOH	Personnel	Personnel
Combat Support	Personnel	EOH	MOS Qual	MOS Qual
Combat Service Support	EOH	EOH	Personnel	MOS Qual
Naval Reserve				
Commissioned Units:				
Air Units	ER	Personnel	Training	ER
Other	Supplies	Personnel	ER	ER
Reinforcing/Sustaining Units	Training	Training	Personnel	Personnel
Marine Corps Reserve				
Overall	MOS Qual	ER	ER	MOS Qual
4th Marine Division	MOS Qual	ER	ER	MOS Qual
4th Marine Air Wing	MOS Qual	MOS Qual	ER	ER
Force Service Support Group (FSSG)	MOS Qual	ER	ER	MOS Qual
Air National Guard				
Overall	EOH	EOH	ER	Training
Combat	Training	EOH	EOH/ER	ER
Combat Support	EOH	EOH	ER	ER
Combat Service Support	EOH	Training	Training	EOH
Air Force Reserve				
Overall	EOH	ER	Personnel	EOH
Flying Units	—	EOH	—	ER
Combat	Personnel/ Training	Training	EOH/ER	ER
Combat Support	EOH	ER	ER	EOH
[1]Coast Guard Reserve				
Reinforcing/Sustaining Units	Logistics Readiness	Training	Training	Personnel

Key: EOH - Equipment On-Hand ER - Equipment Readiness
MOS Qual - Specialty Qualification

[1]Coast Guard Logistics Readiness refers to plans for messing, berthing, and transportation – *not* equipment shortfalls.

Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Data as of 30 September 1984.

The Board believes that Reserve Component capability has increased substantially this year and is encouraged that this trend appears to be continuing into FY 1985. The Board also notes that it is in the area of inadequate quantities of acceptable equipment that most readiness deficiencies occur.

Information on the readiness levels of the Reserve Components has been published in the *Classified Annex* (SECRET) to the Board's *Fiscal Year 1984 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* report. This annex includes detailed profiles of unit readiness for each of the Reserve Components, and is

available to authorized recipients upon written request to the Board.

Several observations concerning Reserve Component readiness from Table 3.1A, *Fiscal Year 1984 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components*, are listed below.

- Overall, 78% of Department of Defense Reserve Component units and 89% of Coast Guard units are required to report readiness.
- The Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve reported that readiness has increased from FY 1983. The Coast Guard Reserve's readiness measured in terms of personnel and training declined slightly since the last report.
- Sixty-four percent (64%) of the Department of Defense Reserve Component units which submit UNITREP's are rated as combat ready, that is C–3/R–3 or better. On an overall basis, all Department of Defense Reserve Component units rated C–3/R–3 or better increased 15%—from 49% on 30 April 1983 to 64% on 30 September 1984. This significant achievement can, to a great extent, be attributed to increased Service attention and special equipment authorization and funding provided for the Reserve Components by Congress.
- The Army National Guard readiness decreased for the second year in a row, while the Army Reserve recouped part of the decrease previously reported.
- The Air Force Reserve reported that readiness declined slightly since the last report, due to conversion actions.

The Board is concerned with the continued suggestions that Reserve Component readiness has "declined" and that these reserve forces might be less prepared today than they were previously. The strength of the data available disproves this contention. During periods of transition, readiness will be reduced until individuals in the units become proficient with the new equipment. However, that situation in no way diminishes the value of having trained personnel on hand in a unit with the capability to mobilize.

Readiness Reporting System—Observed Limitations

The Board continues to believe that the present Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) is not a complete measure of the combat capabilities of a unit. Although the use of UNITREP data to portray readiness has some inherent limitations, it is the only multi-service data system which permits some degree of comparison within and among Services on the readiness of personnel, equipment, and training.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 6, Vol II, Section 6, provides uniform guidance to the Services for reporting unit readiness. The Services, however, prescribe differing requirements and formats within the parameters of that guidance to meet their specific needs. Not all units within specific Reserve Components are required to report readiness.

Examination of the data prepared by the Services and forwarded to the Board for analysis and subsequent inclusion in the FY 1982, FY 1983, and FY 1984 Readiness Assessment reports and this Annual Report continues to reflect a deficiency in the readiness reporting process.

There needs to be a better method to uniformly portray the readiness of the Reserve Components, be it in the use of percentages or some other unit of measure, which will permit discussion of readiness issues.

There is often a lack of comparability between similarly named units in a Service's Active and Reserve Components. These dissimilarities are often *both* quantitative and qualitative. Quantitatively, Reserve Component units can be organized with fewer "required" major end items of equipment when compared to their Active Component counterpart. Although both components within a Service may report readiness of their units to be C–1 "fully combat ready", using identical reporting criteria, it is clear that these similarly named units do not have the same total combat capability. An Active Component unit with 25 primary end items of equipment "assigned" and on hand might have a sister unit in its Reserve Component with 20 primary end items of equipment "assigned" and on hand. Both units report 100% "Equipment on-Hand" levels—or C–1, based on being fully equipped to authorized levels.

There also remains a serious qualitative difference between the Active and Reserve Components. Equipment items in the Reserve Components are often older models which have not been upgraded/modified to the same standards as those in the Active Component. The result creates a decrease in the capability to defeat a given threat. This problem can place a severe strain on maintenance and supply systems. More importantly, older models that have not been upgraded/modified are often less survivable than current models. Yet, based on the reporting criteria, similar units may both report C–1 even though the degree of

mission capability and survivability of these units may vary.

These examples are not unique to any one Service but are consistent in their application within all Components. The Board has taken a strong position against dissimilar organizational structures between Active and Reserve Component units, as it disguises true capability. The board remains convinced that the only way to get modern equipment in the Reserve Components and to assure total integration and interoperability is to identify the shortfalls based on full wartime requirements.

United States Coast Guard— A Continuing Concern

In previous reports the Board has expressed its concern about the manning levels of the Coast Guard; both Active and Selected Reserve. The Board is also concerned about the continuing trend toward the reduction of Coast Guard manpower funding and operational capabilities. The Board believes that the Coast Guard manning levels are far below those required by wartime tasking expectations for adequate safety and security of our ports and waterways.

Increased emphasis by the Administration in stopping sea-landed drug traffic has had a direct impact on the Coast Guard by placing increased demands on the Service at a time when resources are being reduced. Our reliance on the Coast Guard is increasing while funding, manpower, and resources are declining.

Currently, Coast Guard Reserve manpower mobilization requirements are twice the number available. With the advent of the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) concept in which the Coast Guard interfaces with the Navy for coastal defense, expanded missions may be expected once taskings have been developed. At the end of FY 1984, before any new mission taskings, the Coast Guard's Selected Reserve authorized strength meets only 50% to 55% of its M+30 requirements of 25,000.

Summary and Recommendations

The constraints outlined in accurately determining unit readiness are a by-product of a limited readiness reporting system. Each Service applies different standards and criteria to measure its "readiness".

Various reports required by the Services, such as the Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP), sometimes referred to as the "Unit Status Report" (USR), are designed to measure selected elements of a military force such as people, equipment, and training. These are not all-inclusive elements. They are not designed to contain all information required for a comprehensive evaluation of readiness in the entire force.

Through these reports, each using different reporting standards, assumptions, and mechanisms, the unit reports a condition which is not its true capability. What is actually being reported is the perceived degree of readiness each Service's units have based on resources authorized and assigned.

The Board believes that the manning levels of the Coast Guard Reserve are inadequate. The peacetime and wartime operational success of the Coast Guard and the ultimate safety and protection of our coastlines, inland waterways, and our armed forces personnel and supplies which must transit these potentially perilous areas, may not now be assured.

The Board *recommends:*

- . . . the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, redefine the purpose of current "readiness reports" and direct a specific set of standards to be contained within each report. The reports must be uniform, address similar criteria, and include applicable assumptions and considerations in a consistent format.
- . . . resources be provided to expand the mobilization/wartime capabilities of the Coast Guard Reserve.
- . . . the Department of Transportation and the Congress review and increase the authorized end strength level of the Coast Guard Selected Reserve.

CHAPTER 3

MANPOWER

Adequate skilled manpower in Reserve Component units is necessary to sustain a credible Total Force. The availability of trained manpower to provide immediate fill to deploying units on mobilization and sufficient replacements for casualties, is necessary in meeting contingencies.

The Board considered manpower issues in the following nine categories.

- Strength
- Pretrained Individual Manpower
- Health Care Professionals
- Skills
- Full-Time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components
- Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)
- General and Flag Officer Accountability
- Benefits and Entitlements for Reservists on Active Duty
- Incentives

Strength

The Total Force experienced only a slight increase in FY 1984. The Active Component increased less than .01% over FY 1983, while the Selected Reserve grew 4.2% during the same period and achieved 99.5% of the programmed end strength. Table 9 reflects the strength trends of the Reserve Components at the end of FY 1984 together with the history and projections to FY 1990. The Board places continued emphasis on this vital issue and reviews program progress in the annual Readiness Assessment report.

TABLE 9
Strength Trends in the Selected Reserve-Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard-Standby Reserve (as of September 30, 1984)



Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984.* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Of concern again this year is the continued difference between the available Selected Reserve Actual Trained Unit Strength and the Selected Reserve Wartime Unit Requirement (Trained Strength). The need to have the authorized Selected Reserve strength exceed the wartime requirement is reinforced by the shortfall in the "Trained Strength" of the Selected Reserve, and the numbers in the "Training Pipeline." The Board actively supports and endorses the strategy to narrow the gap between the wartime requirements and the available "Trained" Selected Reserve in the years leading up to FY 1991.

Historical data shows an increase in the manpower strength of the Selected Reserve in each Service during the past two fiscal years. The strength trends continue upward with a 14% increase in personnel in the "Training Pipeline." A reduction in the enlisted turnover rate from 27.3% to 25.3% is noted, but remains high. Stability of trained personnel in units is essential, and turnover must be closely monitored to insure trained manpower, capable of performing their assigned mission, is available once mobilized.

There is a sharp upturn in the projected strength of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING). The impact of these projections and the utilization of Reserve Retirees is discussed further under Pretrained Individual Manpower.

Pretrained Individual Manpower—
A Serious Mobilization Shortfall

The Board has long recognized the importance of pretrained individuals as a necessary source of personnel to be recalled in the event of full mobilization. Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM) includes the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Inactive National Guard (ING), Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve. The largest of these four categories is the IRR. The PIM is programmed to be recalled in time of mobilization to fill the manpower gap that would exist between the anticipated wartime requirements and the available manpower in the Active Components and Selected Reserve. Projections assuming high show rates upon mobilization may not be accurate. The Board continues to be concerned about the low strength of the IRR and the heavy reliance on Pretrained Individual Manpower.

The source for strength in the IRR comes from service members who complete their active duty or selected reserve obligation, and have time remaining on their Military Service Obligation (MSO). To help alleviate shortfalls between wartime requirement and the supply, and to increase the size of the IRR, Congress authorized the extension of the Military Service Obligation from six to eight years and the payment of IRR reenlistment bonuses. The new 8-year MSO was implemented on June 1, 1984. Thus, the effects of the new 8-year MSO will not be seen in the IRR end-strength until the FY 1990 time frame.

While there has been success in recruiting for the Active Components and Selected Reserve, there is still a serious shortfall in the Individual Ready Reserve. The IRR has grown about 18,000 during FY 1984 and now stands at about 450,000. The Service composition of the IRR/ING is indicated below:

	(000)
ARNG	9.5
USAR	276.7
USNR	69.2
USMCR	48.4
ANG	—
USAFR	41.0
Total DoD	444.7*
USCGR	5.5
Total	450.2*

* (Figures do not add due to rounding)

Because the PIM is depended upon to provide replacement fillers until newly trained personnel are available, the requirement for a large number of pretrained personnel exists and has been programmed by the Services in all major scenarios. Each Service experiences a peak trained manpower shortfall at a different time. For example, the Air Force's peak shortfall is reached rapidly (M + 30) while the Army's peak shortfall occurs at M + 90. The requirement for pretrained manpower is so great that unless the PIM (primarily the IRR) strength is increased, the ability of our fighting forces to sustain a major military conflict from M-day to M + 90 is severely jeopardized.

It is recognized that programs to increase numbers in the IRR can be effective in the short term; however, specific skill shortages will take longer to resolve. An IRR reenlistment bonus program was implemented in June 1984 to help reduce specific skill shortfalls in the IRR between now and FY 1990 when the longer service obligation will begin to take effect. The effectiveness of the bonus program was demonstrated in the remaining months of FY 1984, when the Army's IRR experienced more than 2,000 reenlistments of those with critical skills.

The Board is hopeful that other programs to reduce the pretrained individual shortfall will be imple-

mented. The Military Departments have proposed programs which include:

- Continuation of initiatives such as peacetime preassignment and predesignation of individuals to mobilization positions
- Training opportunities for more IRR members
- Expansion of service programs for the identification of mobilization positions that retirees can fill
- Maintenance of personnel files of retirees
- Peacetime assignment of retirees to mobilization positions

The Board is also concerned that accurate address lists are maintained to track the IRR members. Cross-referencing with other Federal agencies to locate personnel may be required. Additionally, refresher training should be developed to improve the mobilization readiness of the IRR.

The Board is pleased that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) is actively working many of the aforementioned issues as well as:

- Evaluation of the effectiveness of the IRR reenlistment bonus program
- Requesting extension of the bonus program authority, if indicated
- Expanding the IRR file-matching project to other Reserve Components and implementation of standardized methods to improve IRR location procedures
- Examination of the concept of an annual IRR "muster" similar to that required for the Inactive National Guard (ING) to evaluate physical condition and ensure availability
- Examination of the feasibility of realigning the skill inventory of the IRR to match current or projected shortages in critical wartime skills

Serious manpower shortfalls exist, but the Board is optimistic they can be reduced with appropriate programs and management. The Board is on record in stating that, "failure to resolve the current deficient IRR strength may force a decision for some type of mandatory service, designed to bring the strength of the IRR to sufficient levels to meet manpower needs in the first 180 days of sustained combat." The IRR reenlistment bonus program is viewed as a positive, productive step toward meeting these requirements.

Health Care Professionals

The need for Health Care Professionals in the Reserve Components continues to remain a top priority. The Board's past recommendations to strengthen this critical weakness have yet to be answered. The limited response to incentives which have been implemented clearly indicates that increased effort must be initiated to achieve the desired results. Chapter 6 further addresses medical readiness, personnel and equipment in the Reserve Components.

Skills

The Board notes with pleasure an increased awareness within Congress and the Department of Defense of the necessity to retain and improve skills in the Reserve components. Members of the Reserve, through their individual or unit training, increase their skill level and maintain currency and familarity with assigned equipment.

The maintenance of skill levels and improvement of the Individual Ready Reservist is of concern to the Board. Programs have commenced to identify critical skills in the Services. Persons with these critical skills are eligible for reenlistment bonuses that are given to members in the IRR who maintain their proficiency. These individuals may also participate in skill training on a voluntary basis.

Full-Time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components

The division of responsibility between the Active and Reserve Components has undergone major revisions since the end of the Vietnam era. Reduced active duty manning levels have necessitated greater wartime reliance on the Reserve Components. This in turn has brought major changes in the way Guard and Reserve units are manned, equipped and trained. Reserve Component forces must now achieve and maintain readiness standards that equate to those of similarly configured Active Component units.

The shifting of responsibilities from the Active to the Reserve Components has prompted Congress and the Services to enhance the Guard and Reserve Full-Time Support (FTS) program. As a result, the Reserve Components now have an increased number of qualified training, maintenance, supply and administrative personnel to help sustain the unprecedented level of readiness required in today's national security environment.

Increased FTS manning levels have resulted in significant improvements in Reserve Component unit readiness levels and responsiveness. This conclusion has been reinforced by Active and Reserve Component field commanders as well as results achieved during numerous inspections, reports, and readiness

exercises. Reserve Component units have progressed in recent years from low strength and inadequate equipment to an environment which emphasizes early mobilization, 100% manning and equipage levels, combined arms training, overseas training, and high proficiency levels in individual skills.

Qualified full-time maintenance personnel, instructors, and administrators are vital to insure the time Guardsmen and Reservists spend with their units is used most effectively to gain proficiency with the sophisticated weapons systems of the 1980's. The use of FTS to perform day-to-day functions allows Reservists to concentrate more on training—a primary contributor to mission accomplishment.

Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) assignments must be limited to positions associated with organizing, equipping, administering, recruiting, instructing or training the Reserve Components. The program must not be used as a means to circumvent Active Component end-strength constraints. In addition, AGR personnel should be permitted to remain at their duty assignments for an extended period of time in order to improve the stability of Reserve Component units.

Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)

During Fiscal Year 1984, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) restaffed the ROPMA legislative proposal incorporating, as appropriate, input previously submitted by the Services and this Board. The proposal was later forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for inclusion in the Administration's proposal for the 99th Congress.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board, through its ROPMA Committee, continues to monitor the progress of the ROPMA legislative proposal, in accordance with its statutory responsibility for monitoring the Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA). The obvious relationship between ROPA and ROPMA dictates that the Board closely monitor and report on the proposed ROPMA legislation as it progresses through the legislative process.

General and Flag Officer Accountability

There are less than a dozen active duty general and flag officer positions occupied by Reserve Component General and Flag Officers. For the most part, these positions were created by Congress in order to permit the Reserve Components to administer and manage their own components. These positions should be nonaccountable against the active duty list. Reserve Officers below General and Flag Officer rank are not accountable under the new DOPMA law.

Legislation to make General and Flag Officer positions occupied by Reserve Component General and Flag Officers nonaccountable has been included in legislation introduced as far back as the 97th Congress. At least part of the problem appears to be the effort to include the aforementioned provisions in legislation addressing other issues.

The Board therefore, recommends that the Congress pass separate legislation calling for the removal from Active Component General Officer accountability those Reserve Component General and Flag Officer positions in support of the Reserve Components and occupied by Reserve Component General and Flag Officers on active duty.

Benefits and Entitlements for Reservists on Active Duty

In FY 1983, the Board expressed serious concern about inequality of protection for Reservists serving on short tours of active duty. Benefits and entitlements for all military personnel stem from public laws governed by Congress (United States Code) and by Service regulations. Official policy concerning coverage for Reservists is hard to determine because of discontinuities in the law which have resulted from uncoordinated legislative efforts and Service interpretations over the years.

Reserve members of the uniformed services are authorized benefits and entitlements based on the member's training or duty status when death, injury, illness or disability occurs. Reservists used on any basis, unless they have served on active duty for *more than 30 continuous days*, are not afforded the same benefits on the same basis as Active Component personnel (and their dependents) even though they may be performing like jobs in the same environment.

The greatest disparity is most evident in two areas: benefits resulting from the Reservist's death or from incapacitation as a result of disease or disability. Members on orders over 30 days and their dependents or survivors have different entitlements in certain cases than do Reservists and the dependents and survivors of Reservists who are on active duty under orders specifying a period of less than 30 days.

The impact of these inequalities continues to be magnified through the increased involvement of Reservists to support Active Component missions

abroad. In the very recent past, we have seen Total Force policy become more of a reality as Reservists served in hostile contingencies in Grenada and Lebanon. Though these Reservists served under the same hazardous conditions alongside their full-time Active counterparts, they were not entitled to equal benefits in all cases.

Incentives

The Board continues to evaluate various incentives designed to enhance retention. The Defense Authorization Act of 1984 directed DoD to conduct a one year test revising the commissary benefits of Reserve members to measure the impacts on the commissary system. Current DoD directives only authorize Reserve members and their families to use the Commissary when members are in an active duty status for 72 hours or more. The test authorized the "banking" of one visit to the commissary for each day of active duty up to a maximum of 14 days per year—to be exercised at the discretion of the member. The test was widely publicized among the Reserve forces as an effort to increase benefits and enhance recruitment, retention, and readiness.

In an effort to maintain contact with and assure availability of that portion of the PIM composed of Retired Reservists, a proposal has been made that limited benefits be allowed those individuals as an incentive for the maintenance of a current address and health status, until the normal benefits accrue at age 60. The proposal for limited Exchange privileges and space available transportation is being studied.

Summary and Recommendations

The overall strength of the Reserve Components continues to rise resulting from increased reliance on the contributions of Reservists to the Total Force. The relative importance of Pretrained Individual Manpower as a necessary source of available personnel for full mobilization requires improved management to insure locatability, availability, and skill retention. Therefore, opportunity for the IRR and Selected Reserve to maintain and improve skill levels is of concern to the Board. Continued emphasis on Full-Time Support programs remains an essential part of that skill development. Finally, incentives and entitlements must be provided for recruitment and retention of essential trained personnel to insure they receive treatment equal to their Active Component counterpart when in the service of their country.

The Board *recommends:*

- . . . efforts to increase IRR manning levels and validate IRR and Retiree availability be supported.
- . . . programs be expanded to provide refresher training for the IRR.
- . . . continued support of bonus programs that encourage retention of IRR personnel with critical skills.
- . . . funding for programmed levels of Full-time Support programs be authorized and appropriated.
- . . . the Congress pass separate legislation removing from Active Component accountability those General and Flag Officer positions occupied by Reserve Component General and Flag Officers on active duty in support of the Reserve Components.
- . . . entitlements provided for members of the Reserve Components and their dependents, in the event of death, injury, illness, disability, POW, or declaration of MIA, while in Federal status, be on the same basis—identical in all respects—to those afforded the Active Component membership.
- . . . Reservists be permitted to use their 12 to 14 days of authorized commissary use year-round rather than just during the annual training period.
- . . . carefully monitoring the adequacy of recruiting and retention bonuses as Reserve Component strength requirements rise and the available recruiting cohort shrinks over the next few years.

CHAPTER 4

EQUIPMENT

Equipping the Total Force is one of the most difficult challenges faced by the Active and Reserve Components. Although procurement appropriations have recently increased, they are still not sufficient to provide for a completely modernized and standardized force in the near future.

Public Law 97–86 requires the Services to report to Congress annually on the status of Reserve Component equipment. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)—OASD(RA)—prepares and publishes this report as an annex to *Volume II, Forces Readiness Report-National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report*. This report is often referred to as the "Reserve Component Equipment Report". This document highlights the status of selected equipment items in the Reserve Components, and serves as a standard for the assessment of Reserve Component equipment. This chapter, like the OASD(RA) report, examines equipment in the Reserve Components, but from different perspectives. A direct comparison of the data found in the two reports is not always possible. Together, however, the two reports present a comprehensive picture of the current status of Reserve Component equipment and the projected distribution of that equipment.

Substitute Equipment

The Board continues to express its concern with the practice of some Services to count as "On-Hand and Ready," non-deployable items of equipment or substitute items which have been issued in lieu of standard line items. The practice of counting non-deployable equipment as "On-Hand and Ready" conceals the magnitude of equipment shortfalls in both the Active and Reserve Components. It also retards the resource allocation process. Much of the equipment in the "On-Hand and Ready" category should not be deployed due to its non-compatibility with Active Component equipment. This problem is also known as "lack of interoperability". Additionally, there exists a severe shortage within the supply system of spare parts required to maintain substitute equipment in an operational status. Substitution of equipment is a necessary process when there is insufficient first-line equipment to meet demand. However, the Board believes that the degree of substitution is not fully known or recognized.

Whenever non-deployable or substitute items are issued to Active or Reserve Component units in lieu of the required standard article, such substitute items should be accounted for and reported separately on the UNITREP so they can be clearly identified. Although this problem was identified and discussed first in the Board's FY 1981 Readiness Assessment Report, and annually since FY 1981, the problem continues to be significant because it conceals the magnitude of the equipment shortfalls in the Active and Reserve Components.

Equipment On-Hand Versus Wartime Requirements

When the Equipment On-Hand in the Reserve Components is compared to wartime requirements, there is an overall shortage of approximately $16.4 billion. The dollar value of Equipment On-Hand versus wartime requirements represents an improvement over that reported in FY 1983. The Reserve Components now have approximately 74% of their wartime requirements on-hand (67% in FY 1983).

Table 10 examines each Reserve Component and compares the equipment status reported in FY 1983 with that reported this fiscal year. All data shown are provided by each Service for its respective Reserve Component. Totals for all DoD Reserve Components (minus the Coast Guard Reserve) are shown at the bottom of the table.

TABLE 10
Comparison of Reserve Component Equipment Status – FY 1983 VS 1984 (Expressed in Millions of Current Dollars)

	Total Equipment Items (see Table 5.2)			Status (+/–)		
	Wartime Requirement	Currently Authorized	Currently On Hand	$ Short On Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percent On Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percent On Hand vs Currently Authorized
Army National Guard						
FY 1984	$ 24,711	$ 22,175	$ 15,081	$ 9,630	61%	68%
FY 1983	$ 26,166	$ 25,150	$ 13,696	$ 12,470	52%	54%
Difference (+/–)	$ –1,455	$ –2,975	$ +1,385	$ –2,840		
Percent Change	– 5%	– 12%	+ 10%	– 23%	+ 9%	+14%
Army Reserve						
FY 1984	$ 6,677	$ 4,651	$ 3,442	$ 3,235	52%	74%
FY 1983	$ 6,378	$ 5,173	$ 3,216	$ 3,162	50%	62%
Difference (+/–)	$ +299	$ –522	$ +226	$ + 73		
Percent Change	+ 5%	– 10%	+ 7%	+ 2%	+ 2%	+12%
Naval Reserve[1]						
FY 1984	$ 4,174	$ 4,174	$ 3,757	$ 417	90%	90%
FY 1983	$ 4,219	$ 4,219	$ 3,760	$ 459	89%	89%
Difference (+/–)	$ – 45	$ – 45	$ – 3	$ – 42		
Percent Change	– 1%	– 1%	0%	– 9%	+ 1%	+ 1%
Marine Corps Reserve						
FY 1984	$ 3,129	$ 3,129	$ 2,543	$ 586	81%	81%
FY 1983	$ 2,506	$ 2,506	$ 2,298	$ 208	92%	92%
Difference (+/–)	$ +623	$ +623	$ +245	$ +378		
Percent Change	+ 25%	+ 25%	+ 11%	+182%	–11%	–11%
Air National Guard						
FY 1984 [2]	$ 17,998	$ 17,998	$ 15,600	$ 2,398	87%	87%
FY 1983 [2]	$ 6,874	$ 6,874	$ 6,067	$ 807	88%	88%
Difference (+/–) [3]	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		
Percent Change [3]	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Air Force Reserve						
FY 1984	$ 5,999	$ 5,999	$ 5,848	$ 151	97%	97%
FY 1983	$ 6,145	$ 6,145	$ 5,991	$ 154	97%	97%
Difference (+/–)	$ –146	$ –146	$ –143	$ – 3		
Percent Change	– 2%	– 2%	– 2%	– 2%	0%	0%
All DoD Services						
FY 1984	$ 62,688	$ 58,126	$ 46,271	$ 16,417	74%	80%
FY 1983	$ 52,288	$ 50,067	$ 35,028	$ 17,260	67%	70%
Difference (+/–) [3]	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		
Percent Change [3]	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

[1] 1983 data corrected for proper pricing, all figures in 1984 dollars.
[2] FY 83 data reported from T0025-30, Ch1, 15 Dec 80, *Unit Cost of Aircraft, Missiles and engines.*.
FY 84 data reported from AFR 173-13, Aug 84, *US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors (cost analysis).*
[3] Different costing guides preclude accurate comparison of FY 83 and FY 84 data.

Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984.* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Data as of 30 September 1984.

It is vitally important that the wartime requirements of our Guard and Reserve Forces be validated and the equipment inventory to support the wartime requirements be identified.

Equipping the Reserve Components

In discussing resource allocations for the Guard and Reserve, the Board is aware that substantial contributions were made by the Services in FY 1984 to support their Reserve Components.

The Board acknowledges:

- In most cases, a given Service's budget includes funding for research, development, and equipment acquisition for both Active and Reserve Components, with the Reserve Component portion neither specifically identified, nor fiscal responsibility assigned.
- There are cases where newly acquired equipment will come directly to the Reserve Component from the Service. There have also been cases during the last several years where visible equipment shortfalls in the Guard or Reserve have resulted in Congress providing separate procurement appropriations.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve

During FY 1984, over $946 million in equipment was delivered to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve—more than double the $465 million in equipment delivered during FY 1983.

Both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are short equipment for radar, communications, carriers, and artillery. The National Guard shows a shortfall in air defense artillery. The USAR is short a significant amount of tactical automatic data processing equipment. The Army National Guard has only 61% of Equipment On-Hand versus wartime requirements. The USAR is in worse condition with only 52% of its wartime required Equipment On-Hand. Both Reserve Components continue to report that lack of equipment is the *most critical major factor* limiting overall readiness.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve historically have suffered from severe equipment shortages caused by inadequate equipment budgets. As first expressed in a *Special Report* as part of the *Fiscal Year 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components*, the Board is pleased to note the significant progress made by the Army staff in improving the readiness and sustainability of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Nonetheless, the severity of equipment shortages dictates that the Army and Congress continue to give this issue close attention.

Naval Reserve

During FY 1984, the Navy transferred to the Naval Reserve three FFG–7 frigates, nine A–7E's, eight SH–2F's, 15 F–4's and 18 P3B aircraft. Major procurements for the Naval Reserve in FY 1984 included $128 million in aircraft modifications, spares, and support equipment. The Naval Reserve also acquired six additional C–9 transport aircraft, four MK–14 Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), and $9 million of other investment material (e.g. vehicles and construction).

The Naval Reserve continues to receive increases in equipment and parts. However, because the Navy in some cases, now reports on-hand assets the same as requirements, and does not reflect as requirements the need for more modern equipment when usable equipment is assigned (e.g. F–14s to replace F–4s), the Board believes that actual equipment requirements for the Naval Reserve are understated.

Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps is modernizing its ground assets to upgrade current capability. A large percentage of obsolete ground equipment in the USMCR is being replaced by new equipment. This modernization program to upgrade capability commenced noticeably in FY 1984.

In accordance with Marine Corps policy, Reserve units maintain an equipment training allowance of approximately 50% of their total wartime requirements at local training centers. Fifty percent is the amount of equipment required for training and which can be adequately maintained and stored at local training centers. The remaining equipment required for mobilization is held at Marine Corps logistics bases. The Marine Corps Reserve reports a total equipment shortage of $587,436,000. However, current programs should essentially eliminate these shortages by the end of FY 1988.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve

Modernization of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve depends heavily on Congressional support of Air Force procurement policies and rates. For example, the Air Guard and Reserve require additional tactical fighters to replace the high operating cost, manpower intensive F–4's. Whether the modernization should be by transfer of programmed

F–15's and F–16's, or procurement of additional new aircraft, is for others to decide. The Board believes the acquisition of new tactical fighters to prevent block obsolescence of Air Guard and Reserve Squadrons, is essential much earlier than presently programmed.

Previous annual reports have indicated an improving trend for major end-items of equipment for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. This improvement can be directly attributed to Air Force commitment and effective programming in providing sufficient equipment to make the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve partners in the Total Force.

The continuing emphasis and support of Reserve Component modernization and readiness by the Air Force and Congress have resulted in the Air National Guard possessing 87% of the dollar value of required wartime equipment, and the Air Force Reserve possessing 97% of the value of its wartime equipment.

Coast Guard Reserve

Upon mobilization, most Coast Guard Reservists will be assigned to existing active duty units. They will use existing active force equipment. Current plans call for identified shortfalls at Active commands to be met by off-the-shelf purchases. Analysis of equipment requirements resulting from new readiness plans is expected to identify additional shortfalls that may require premobilization acquisition.

Average Age of Equipment

Equipment age is a problem in both the Active and Reserve Components, although greatly magnified in the Reserve Components. Many Reserve Components are working with outdated equipment that is different from the equipment they would encounter on mobilization. The age of equipment in the Active, Guard, and Reserve is an important factor affecting wartime capability. The Board will continue to monitor and solicit data for future reports and to encourage the direct purchase and/or flow of state-of-the-art equipment to the Reserve Components.

Equipment Storage

As more equipment is brought into the Reserve Components there will be increased demands to provide for adequate and secure storage facilities. In addition, greater reliance on the Guard and Reserve for the Total Force, and equipping and manning these units to higher levels, has increased use of armories and facilities.

This increase in facility utilization has increased maintenance and repair costs due to inflation, plus greater fuel, utility and other normal maintenance and operating costs. State legislative bodies have generally been conservative in increasing appropriations for armory maintenance. In fact normal maintenance has been frequently delayed in order to accomplish emergency major maintenance. The previous Board position in the FY 1983 Annual Report that recommended the Federal contribution to construction of armories be changed from 75% to 90% may no longer be a valid issue when compared to the cost of operation and maintenance.

Congressional Interest in Equipping the Reserve Components

Congress has become increasingly concerned about Reserve Component equipment shortages. In 1981, Congress directed the DoD to report annually on the status of equipment and funding in the Guard and Reserve required to equip the Guard and Reserve to fulfill their wartime missions.

The Board continues to monitor the Services' response to the Secretary of Defense's policy memorandum of June 21, 1982, which states in part: "... units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component." The Board believes that unless significant progress is shown in equipping the Reserve Components, Congress will take the initiative. Congress has made line item approprations directed at modernizing the Reserve Components and has added substantial dollars to the FY 1985 budget.

Board's Position on Equipment

It is the Board's position, as in FY 1983, that steps should be taken to program on-hand equipment levels to full wartime requirements for the Active and Reserve Components. This program should include the requirements of the expanded training base to meet the demands of full mobilization.

The Board is aware of the difficult decisions and fiscal reality associated with such a program, but is convinced this deficiency cannot be resolved on a hit-or-miss basis. The present shortages must be recognized, acknowledged, and a specific plan developed to eliminate the deficiencies within the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).

Summary and Recommendations

Equipping the Total Force is a challenge for both the Active and Reserve Components. Although pro-

curement appropriations have increased, they are still not sufficient to modernize the Total Force.

The Board is concerned over the increasing tendency for some Services to use a variable or "floating" level of wartime equipment requirements. The current practice distorts the true picture by concealing the level of equipment short-falls and could reduce Congressional support for equipment procurements destined for the Reserve Components.

The Board *recommends:*

- . . . steps be taken to program On-Hand Equipment levels to full wartime requirements for the Active and Reserve Components. This program should include the requirements of the expanded training base to meet the demands of full mobilization.
- . . . that equipment issued to the Reserve Components be mission capable, compatible, and interoperable with equipment issued to the Active Components.
- . . . whenever non-deployable or substitute items are issued to units in lieu of the required standard item, the problem should be stated on the UNITREP, with such items accounted for whether listed on the UNITREP or separately.
- . . . when equipment in the Active Components is modified to accommodate increased capability, supportability, safety and survivability, equipment in the Reserve Components should also be programmed for modification.
- . . . increased support of military construction requests designed to provide adequate storage and maintenance facilities for assigned equipment.
- . . . cost of operations, maintenance and repair of armories should be equitably shared by Federal and State governments.

CHAPTER 5

TRAINING

In the event of an armed conflict, the quality and quantity of training received by the Reserve Components will play a substantial role in determining their effectiveness on mobilization. Yet, despite its vital importance, training remains the most difficult and elusive aspect of Reserve Component readiness to measure.

Factors Influencing Training

Part of the difficulty in accurately measuring training is the fact that training readiness is directly influenced by a wide variety of interdependent factors:

- Availability of adequate numbers of training personnel
- Realistic training missions and goals
- Budget resources committed to support training
- Service school opportunities to train personnel, trainers, decision makers, and managers
- Availability of training areas and equipment

Efficient use of these resources is critical in achieving the maximum training experience for Reserve Component personnel.

Peacetime Training

In today's rapid response environment, our nation no longer has the luxury of a long warning time in which to accommodate extensive post-mobilization training. Competency must be attained during peacetime.

The Board is pleased to note that FY 1984 has been a milestone year for Reserve Component training. All Services report highly successful participation in significant training activities which have contributed to the readiness of the Total Force. Such training activities were highlighted by the Army National Guard's participation in exercise MINUTEMAN I, the Army Reserve's involvement in REFORGER 84, the Naval Reserve's Lebanon and Eastern Mediterranean operations, the Marine Corps Reserve's PHALANX SOUND II, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve in VOLANT OAK and overseas deployment training, and the Coast Guard Reserve's port and waterside operations. Table 11, "Reserve Component Selected Training Activities, FY 1984," summarizes major training activities of the Reserve Components.

TABLE 11
Reserve Component Selected Training Activities, FY 1984

Army National Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	USMC Reserve	Air National Guard	USAF Reserve	USCG Reserve
Overseas Deployment 427 units, 7,000 personnel	Overseas Deployment over 485 units/cells, 6,707 personnel	Surface Forces - 94,000 mandays in support of fleet exercises	TEAMWORK 84	Volant Partner	Volant Partner	SUMMER STOCK - Search and Rescue Stations
JCS Exercises 284 units, 13,000 personnel	JCS Exercises 225 units/cells, 3,070 personnel	Maritime Patrol Squadrons - equivalent of 46 weeks of fleet support	OCEAN VENTURE 84	Checkered Flag	Checkered Flag	WORLDS FAIR - Port Security
REFORGER 84-51 units, 2700 personnel	REFORGER 84 49 units/cells, 954 personnel	Composite Squadrons - 6,259 flight hours	CAX 8-84	Sentry Dragon	Volant Oak	SHUTTLE SUPPORT - Port Security and liaison activities with NASA officials.
LOGEX 84-100 units, 700 personnel	Counterpart Training	Drug Interdiction Program - 1,240 flight hours	CAX 9-84	Coronet Cove	JCS Field Tng Exercises	OLYMPICS - waterside security, support to Coast Guard and Navy explosive ordnance disposal forces; and Dignitary protection services.
FUERZAS UNIDAS/ MINUTEMAN I 1400 personnel	LOGEX 84	Ship Repair and Overhaul - 118,000 mandays	LOGEX 84	Volant Oak	Red, Green, Blue, Maple Flag Field Tng Exercises	EXERCISES - Coast Guard operational Exercises (14) - 1390 Reservists, Exercises (15) - 783 Reservists, CPX's - 8 Exercises, 94 Reservists
Gaining Command Individual Training	310th TAACOM CORNERSTONE FTX	Navai Intelligence - extensive support	Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force - MCATF	Volant Dew	Silver Flag Alpha Army Field Tng Ex.	Reforger 84 Ocean Venture Ocean Safari Gallant Knight 84 Gallant Eagle 84
Key Personnel Upgrade Program	Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises	Cargo Handling Battalions - 2,506 mandays	PHALANX SOUND II	AJAR Rail	MAC Channel and SAAM Missions	
National Training Center	FUERZAS UNIDAS/ MINUTEMAN I	Reserve Naval Construction Battalions 20,000 mandays	FIREX/MCCRES	Advanced Airlift Tactical Training Center	Strategic Air Refueling	
OCONUS Small Unit Exchange	NATO/Pacific Counterpart and Contingency Training	Battleship New Jersey 10,000 mandays	RESPHIBLEX 84	Composite Force Exercises	Aerial Port Augmentation	
40th Inf Div(M), CA ARNG, FTX		Airlift - 37,560 flight hours		A-7 RTU	Strategic Airlift Maintenance	
VULCAN KNIGHT III		Control of shipping - over 16,000 mandays		RF/F-4 RTU	Joint Airborne Air Transportability Tng (JA/ATT)	
Pacific Counterpart and Contingency Training		Tactical Air Wing Weapon and Carrier qualification 2 air wings - 12 squadrons		WSO Training		
NATO Counterpart and Contingency Training		ASW helicopter Support to NRF ships-transition training by first LAMPS I helicopter squadron		Red Flag		
48th Inf Bde (M), GA ARNG, AT 84				Cope Thunder		
Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises				Joint Airborne Air Transportability Tng (JA/ATT)		
				Wintex		

Source: *Reserve Forces Policy Board, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, FY 1984*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Data as of 30 September 1984.

Training activities such as the above provided the Reserve Components with opportunities for challenging, real-world, mission-oriented training during FY 1984. Such training operations, however, coupled with federally mandated individual and unit training requirements, CAPSTONE training, Panama rotations, and the like, take large amounts of time—often more than the minimum annual training requirements for Guardsmen and Reservists. The Board suggests that additional flexible training mandays should be provided to the Guard and Reserve for enhanced training readiness in the following areas:

- Individual training
- Small unit/group training
- Overseas deployment training
- National Training Center and Red Flag rotations
- Major exercise participation
- New and displaced equipment training

The Board cautions, however, that additional training time requirements be prescribed judiciously with full cognizance of the effect on the individual, the member's family, the civilian employer and the community. Training periods which exceed two consecutive weeks, while often highly desirable in achieving proficiency, should only be implemented at the discretion of the local commander.

Performance of Reserve Component units of all the Services in competitive events, unit deployment exercises, JCS and Major Command sponsored exercises, and day-to-day support of the Active Components is a strong indicator that the currently required training periods with supplemental manday support is a proven and demonstrably successful approach.

Use of Training Simulators and Devices

The use of training simulators and devices represents the most exciting, innovative, economical and effective technique for enhancing Reserve Component readiness. Fully recognizing the value of simulators, the Army is investing over $100 million in such training devices for its Reserve Components during the FY 1984 to FY 1986 time frame. The Navy, too, has recognized the value of such devices to facilitate training and has introduced new shipboard simulators at centralized Naval Reserve drill locations throughout the United States.

The Board wishes to highlight the urgent need for training devices in all Reserve Components. The end result will include significant savings in repair parts and energy products, as well as enhanced training, better use of available time, and, most importantly, improved combat readiness. This has been demonstrated time and again in evaluations and comments from training installations.

The Board also stresses the importance of placing additional emphasis on the development of training simulators which will accommodate unique Reserve Component training requirements. It is equally important that such training devices be placed where they can be shared by all components who utilize similar equipment.

Summary and Recommendations

The Board firmly believes that excellence in training is the key to effective execution of wartime tasks and continues to support meaningful, real-world training for the Reserve Components. Relevant training can make the difference between a static unit and a vibrant one; therefore, the Board was pleased that FY 1984 was a milestone year for the majority of Reserve Components through their participation in meaningful training operations. Such active participation, coupled with federally mandated training requirements and escalating individual and unit training demands, dictates the need for additional flexible training mandays for the Guard and Reserve. An across-the-board mandatory increase in training requirements, however, would likely create personal hardships for many individuals who are valuable, trained wartime assets, and could have a negative impact from the standpoint of retention.

The use of training simulators and devices has resulted in dynamic training experiences and higher retention rates, especially for those personnel with valuable high-tech skills. The Board is firmly convinced that the use of such training simulators and devices is one of the most cost-effective ways of maximizing efficient use of available training time.

The Board *recommends:*

- . . . *discretionary* programs for *selected* increases in available training time that may be applied by local commanders to best enhance the readiness of their units. The current required training periods and use of manday programs for additional training have proved to be highly successful when Reserve Component unit performance and accomplishments are measured in competitive events and Active Component sponsored exercises.

- . . . continued support of expanded opportunities for participation of Selected Reservists in exercises and overseas training.

- . . . additional funding for training simul and devices, which are designed and loc based on solid Active/Reserve Compo planning.

CHAPTER 6

MEDICAL

In the past, the Board has examined and reported on Medical Readiness in the Reserve Components. Studies by the Board confirm continuing deficiencies in the areas of available medical personnel, management of medical personnel, medical unit readiness, and medical equipment. However, the Board is pleased to confirm that some progress is now being made in the area of combat medical care, particularly in the overall increase of available medical care personnel and medical equipment funding.

Readiness

While overall Reserve medical readiness has shown an improvement during FY 1984, the Board believes that continued emphasis is necessary. Adequate manpower, possessing combat-oriented medical skills continues as a top priority. It is the Board's position that increased participation in realistic, combat-oriented medical training is necessary for all Reserve Component medical units. This training should be augmented by exposure to JCS, Service and Gaining Command exercises. Additionally, the Board is encouraged by continuing efforts to increase the number of Reserve Component medical units attaining readiness ratings prescribed by their Authorized Level of Organization (ALO).

Personnel

A comparison of Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and Service-provided data for medical Reserve personnel has revealed inconsistencies. The Board is concerned because policy decisions affecting Reserve Component medical personnel are made utilizing DMDC data.

The Services report a pool of approximately 65,000 medical personnel in the IRR, Standby Reserve, and Active Component retired categories. Given the size of this pool, all Service medical planners need to develop an automated management program to identify age, disabilities, specialties, training, skill levels, and gender to ensure rapid mobilization accessibility and assignment of Reserve Component and retired medical personnel.

To be assured that the requirements for professional medical care are met, the Board again recommends that the Selective Service Law be amended to provide for registration and identification of male and female professional medical personnel who could be rapidly drafted in the event of a national emergency.

Medical Equipment

Plans for pre-positioning Reserve Component unit equipment for hospital organizations at European collocated operating bases have generally not been completed. Long lead times are required to acquire and place hospital equipment. Reserve Component hospitals could be deployed, only to find they do not have the equipment required to accomplish their mission.

Previous reports by the Board expressed concern with the status of medical equipment available to the Guard and Reserve. The Board notes that the Defense Resources Board (DRB) has taken action to ensure that the Services accelerate plans to activate combat hospitals. However, the Services' budgets must be increased by $1.7 billion over the next five years to meet the requirements for combat hospitals.

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report submitted with the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Act, acknowledged that the Services will not be granted funds to achieve both the need for increases in medical care and new weapons systems. The Committee made it clear that it "... expects the Services to allocate a portion of end-strength increases to staffing readiness support functions like medical care."

Summary and Recommendations

The Board recognizes that sufficient funding to totally provide for acknowledged medical needs in the Guard and Reserve Forces may not be available. It strongly urges each Service to evaluate current and projected needs for both manpower and equipment. The realities of combat, based on current wartime scenarios, require funding be available for mandatory medical needs.

The Board *recommends:*

- ... completion of management systems to locate, track, classify, and pre-assign medical personnel under age 60 who have retired from the Guard and Reserve.

- . . . reconciliation of the Reserve Component Common Personnel Data Base and Service data bases.
- . . . shortages of Health Care Professionals be more aggressively addressed, requiring registration with the Selective Service System as well as expansion of membership in the IRR.
- . . . future recruitment of Health Care Professionals be based upon specialty-specific needs which enhance the overall medical readiness posture.
- . . . members of the Health Care Profession be carefully categorized by specialty for utilization and assignment to treatment facilities immediately on mobilization.
- . . . completion of plans for equipping hospital organizations at European collocated operating bases.

CHAPTER 7

BOARD ACTIVITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984

Fiscal Year 1984 was an intensive year for Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) involvement in defense issues. The Board participated in a broad spectrum of topics affecting both the Reserve Components and the Total Force.

The Chairman and other members of the Board provided testimony before the Congress on more occasions than in previous years. The advice and counsel of the Board was sought by a variety of influential groups both within and outside of government.

Finally, during this year, the Board undertook a new and unique series of field visitations overseas. At the invitation of General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and General Glenn K. Otis, USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe, the Board participated in the first phase of a two-part field visitation to NATO. Over a period of two weeks, the Board visited NATO's Northern flank—Belgium, Norway, and the Federal Republic of Germany, plus Sweden. The plan for next fiscal year is to visit the Southern Flank of NATO. The purpose of the visits is to learn more about the interface of our Active and Reserve Forces. An additional purpose is to ascertain how our NATO partners, as well as neutral nations, maintain, train and deploy their Reserve Forces during wartime.

Former RFPB Chairman Dies

The Board paid tribute during the May meeting to former Board Chairman John Slezak who died in April 1984. Mr. Slezak had a distinguished career both in industry and in government. An engineer by profession, he was an executive in industry in the Chicago area. He served as Assistant Secretary of the Army and later as Under Secretary of the Army. He held the grade of Colonel in the Army Reserve. Mr. Slezak served as Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for two decades (1957–1977). While serving in that position, he was awarded the Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service on two occasions—in 1973 and again in 1977.

Legislation Impacting on RFPB

The Omnibus Defense Authorization Act, 1985, made a change to 10 USC 175 which authorized an increase in membership of the Reserve Forces Policy Board from 21 to 22 members. The provision stated that: "Whenever the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy, the Secretary of Transportation may designate two officers of the Coast Guard, regular or reserve, to serve as voting members of the Board.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984, authorized the increase in number of Assistant Secretaries in the Department of Defense from seven to eleven. One of the additional four new Assistant Secretaries was specifically designated to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The principal duty of that office was specified to be the overall supervision of Reserve Component affairs in the Department of Defense.

The first person to hold that office is the Honorable James H. Webb, Jr., who was sworn in by Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger on May 23, 1984.

Meetings of the Board

During Fiscal Year 1984, the Board met in formal session on four separate occasions, one of which encompassed the field visitation to European sites.

The Board met during FY 1984 on the following dates:

December 12–14, 1983
March 12–14, 1984
May 19–June 2, 1984
September 17–19, 1984

Committees of the Board

The Board has continued to improve its effectiveness by the establishment of committees composed of Board members who examine specific issues and conduct studies of matters brought before the RFPB. There are two types of committees—Standing Committes and Special Committees. The Standing Committees are the Personnel and Manpower Committee, and the Mobilization and Deployment Com-

mittee. These committees normally meet in conjunction with the formal meetings of the Board. Special Committees are created and abolished as needed and normally meet at times other than during formal sessions of the Board. Currently, there are two such committees. One is the ROPMA Committee which is providing oversight review to the development of the proposed ROPMA legislative package. The other is the Active/Reserve Mix Committee. That committee is assisting the Board's congressionally mandated requirement to comment on the Department of Defense study on the same subject.

Reports and Publications

- *Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1983*
- *Fiscal Year 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components*
- *Quarterly Reports to Congress. The Board continues to submit summaries of Reserve Component issues discussed, and subsequent recommendations formulated during each quarterly Board meeting*

Briefings and Meetings with Policy Makers

The Chairman and the Board continued to consult with, and receive briefings from, key U.S. and foreign Defense officials, senior military commanders, and Congressional leaders. This year also brought increased dialogue between the RFPB and the various Service policy boards and councils. Persons meeting with the Chairman and/or the Board included:

- Congressman Joseph P. Addabbo, Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense
- Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary of the Air Force
- Honorable James R. Ambrose, Under Secretary of the Army
- Brigadier Jens P. Andersen, Colocated Operating Bases, Norway
- Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation
- Lieutenant General Thomas D. Ayers, USA, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe
- Major General Ola Berg, Inspector General, Norwegian Home Guard, Oslo, Norway
- Lieutenant General U. Berg, Commander, Defense Command North, Norway
- Major General Thorbjorn Bergersen, Commanding General, District Command, Trondelog, Norway
- Ms. Sue Bodilly, Rand Corporation
- Brigadier General Louis H. Buehl, III, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp LeJeune
- Major General Murphy A. Chesney, USAF, MC, Deputy Surgeon General
- Major General George Coates, ARNGUS, Chairman, Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee
- Major General John B. Conaway, USAF, Director, Air National Guard
- Colonel George H. Connor, Jr., USA, Acting Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical Matters
- Colonel William W. Crouch, USA, Commander, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Germany
- General James Dalton, USAF, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
- Colonel Angelo deGuttadauro, USAR, Senior Army Reserve Advisor to SACEUR, SHAPE Element, Belgium
- Rear Admiral James S. Elfelt, USN, J3, EUCOM
- Mr. Alexander Faison, Special Assistant for Resources Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Brigadier Karl-Eric Fernander, Commander, F–16 Air Force Wing, 2nd Middle Air Defense Sector, Sweden
- Rear Admiral John Fetterman, Jr., USN, Commander, Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
- Major General John L. France, ANGUS, Chairman, Air Reserve Forces Policy Committee
- Brigadier General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., USA, Commander, 7th Army Training Command, Germany
- Honorable Louis Giuffrida, Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Major General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., USMC, Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division
- Brigadier General Arthur Green, USAFR, Mobilization Assistant to Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
- Mr. Charles Groover, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Integration)
- Honorable Nils O. Gylden, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden
- Major General Charles R. Hamm, USAF, Deputy Director of Plans, U.S. Air Force

- Colonel Harold Hansen, ARNGUS, Senior Army National Guard Advisor to CINCUSAREUR
- Brigadier General Edward J. Heinz, USAF, Director of Intelligence, EUCOM
- Brigadier General Hansford T. Johnson, USAF, Deputy Director, Programs and Evaluation, USAF
- Brigadier General Frank J. Kelley, Jr., USAF, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Military Airlift Command
- Major General Gerd Helmut Komossa, Commander, German Territorial Southern Command
- Mr. George C. Kopcsak, Director, Office of Munitions, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
- Major General Nicklas Landergren, Ministry of Defense, Stockholm, Sweden
- General Richard L. Lawson, USAF, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command
- Honorable William Mayer, MD, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
- Mr. Sherrod McCall, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden
- Colonel John Matheny, USAF, Conference on Security/Confidence Building and Disarmament, Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy), Stockholm, Sweden
- General Billy Minter, USAF, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces Europe
- Lieutenant General Bernhard T. Mittemeyer, MC, Surgeon General, U.S. Army
- Congressman G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Member, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation
- Captain David Moss, USN, Naval Attache, U.S. Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden
- Lieutenant Colonel Tore Naess, Military Attache, Embassy of Norway
- Brigadier General Joseph L. Nagel, USA, Deputy Commander, V Corps
- King Olav, King of Norway
- Major General Stephen Olmstead, USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps
- General Glenn K. Otis, USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe
- Brigadier General Christian Patte, USA, Deputy Commander, 21st Support Command, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army
- Dr. Richard Pei, Rand Corporation
- General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
- Rear Admiral Robert B. Rogers, USN, Commander, Amphibious Group Two.
- Rear Admiral Howard Roop, USNR, Deputy Director of Naval Reserve
- Vice Admiral William H., Rowden, USN, Commander, Military Sealift Command
- Major General John J. Salesses, USMCR, Commanding General, 4th Marine Division
- Brigadier General C. Dean Sangalis, USMCR, Commanding General, 2nd Marine Amphibious Brigade
- Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, Director, Office for Combating Terrorism, Department of State
- Mr. John F. Schank, Rand Corporation
- Brigadier General Roger P. Scheer, USAFR, Deputy Director, Air Force Reserve
- Vice Admiral L. H. Seaton, MC, Surgeon General, U.S. Navy
- Mr. Dennis R. Shaw, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
- Mr. Edward D. Sims, Logistics Management Institute
- General Lawrence A. Skantz, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF
- Colonel Nils Skarland, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy, Headquarters, Norwegian Defense Command, Oslo, Norway
- Major General Harold I. Small, USA, Commander, Military Traffic Management Command
- Mr. Donald W. Srull, Logistics Management Institute
- Brigadier General Klaus-Christoph Steinkopff, Defense Attache, Federal Republic of Germany
- Colonel Claes Tamm, Military Attache, Embassy of Sweden
- Major General Francis J. Toner, USAF, Director, Logistics and Security Assistance, EUCOM
- Colonel Lawrence L. Tracy, USA, Senior Defense Advisor, Office of Latin American Public Diplomacy, Department of State
- Major General Richard T. Trundy, USMC, Commanding General, 4th Marine Air Wing
- Honorable Thomas K. Turnage, Director, Selective Service System
- Honorable James H. Webb, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
- Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense
- General Larry D. Welch, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF

- Mr. Ronald E. Woods, Deputy Chief of Mission U.S. Embassy, Oslo, Norway

Field Visits

During FY 1984, the Board collectively and individually continued to attend meetings, visit a wide variety of field sites, and observe exercises and activities relating to Board responsibilities and areas of interest. These visits included:

- 446th Military Airlift Wing (Associate), McChord Air Force Base, Washington
- Trident Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington
- I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington
- Naval Amphibious School, Norfolk, Virginia
- 2nd Marine Division, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
- Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina
- Exercise PHALANX SOUND II
- Supreme Allied Command, Europe; Mons, Belgium
- U.S. Embassy, Oslo, Norway
- Northern European Command, Allied Force Command North (AFNORTH), Norway
- Headquarters, Norwegian Defense Command
- District Command (Trondelog), Norway
- Vaernes Air Station, Norway
- Rinnleiret, Norway
- Defense Command North, Rinnleiret, Norway
- Bodo Main Air Station, Bodo, Norway
- U.S. Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden
- F–16 Air Force Wing, 2nd Middle Air Defense Sector, Sweden
- Ministry of Defense, Stockholm, Sweden
- Remagen, Germany
- Ministry of Defense, Bonn, Germany
- Headquarters, United States Army Command Europe, Heidelberg, Germany
- German Territorial Southern Command, Heidelberg, Germany
- 21st Support Command, Kaiserslautern, Germany
- Combat Equipment Group Europe (CEGE) site, Kaiserslautern, Germany
- Allied Command Europe (ACE), Brussels, Belgium
- U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE), Ramstein, Germany
- 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, East German Border
- 7th Army Training Command, Grafenwoehr, Germany
- V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany
- United States Command Europe (EUCOM)
- USS Saipan (LHA–2)
- Marine Air Group (MAG–20)
- U.S. Marine Corps Air Station, New River, North Carolina
- U.S. Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia
- 2nd Marine Amphibious Brigade, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Comments on Board Activities

Questions and comments on either the Board's *Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1984* or *Fiscal Year 1984 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* are both encouraged and welcomed.

Please address any comments to:

Reserve Forces Policy Board
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 3B256—The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301–7300

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The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1984, is a reflection of the consensus of the 22 member Board. Although most recommendations and policy changes had unanimous support, neither this report nor the signature of the Members purport to indicate that the Military Departments, Services or signers concur with each and every recommended action.